

SOLVING THE PUZZLE: THE WATER COURT STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF WATER ADMINISTRATION IN NEW MEXICO

I. INTRODUCTION

Water is the most precious resource in the arid deserts of New Mexico yet developing and defining a coherent process for administering and adjudicating this resource has proven elusive. New Mexico's haphazard development of a procedure for the final adjudication of water rights muddles understanding of the actual process for administering permitted water rights prior to their final adjudication.¹ This paper will attempt to synthesize and contextualize the intent and holding in the evolution of relevant governing authorities of statutes, regulations, and case law. Throughout the Western states, the particular process of administering and/or adjudicating water rights has varied as the unique historical, hydrologic, and political circumstance of each state has demanded, and New Mexico is no exception.²

At the outset, the three components of New Mexico's water rights administration process must be addressed to acquire a preliminary understanding of the state's water scheme.³ First, there is the regulatory process of administering water rights through the office of the State Engineer.^{3B} Second, is the role of "Water Courts" in resolving water-related issues in a non-final adjudication function.^{3C} Third, and finally, is the "Adjudication Court," which holds exclusive jurisdiction to determine final water rights predicated on the basic elements of ownership.⁴

¹ CAROL ROMERO-WIRTH & SUSAN KELLY, WATER RIGHTS MANAGEMENT IN NEW MEXICO AND ALONG THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE: IS AWRM SUFFICIENT? 7 Nov. (2012), https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=utton_pubs.

² N.M. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 1-2 (Sept. 14, 2007), <https://www.ose.state.nm.us/NMAC/Adjudication/AOC-AdjudicationWhitePaper.pdf>.

³

^{3B} *Id.*

^{3C} *Id.*

⁴ N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-4-19 (1978)

Granted, this is a rather simplistic generalization of the three components involved in administering water rights and consequently ignores the fact that New Mexico established each component at different times to serve different yet interconnected purposes.^{4A} However, the common factor in these three integral components is a lack of clear and consolidated procedure setting forth the roles and functions of each component.⁵ As an example of the resulting confusion, neither the established statutory Water Code, case law, nor regulations distinguish or label these components by their respective formal names of “Water Courts” and “Adjudication Courts.”⁶

Throughout this paper, the term “Water Court” refers both to the established water court divisions created by the Supreme Court order of January 27, 2004, and to those district courts which have previously decided water issues resulting in the appellate body of law on such issues. However, such Water Court decisions were not final determinations of water rights in a system-wide adjudication.⁷ References to “Adjudication Court” are to courts endowed with exclusive jurisdiction over system-wide adjudications to make final water rights determinations under N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978, section 72-4-17; a Supreme Court order designates an adjudication judge to conduct such final adjudications.⁸

Without the benefit of formal nomenclature, New Mexico water administration begins to resemble an unsolvable puzzle with seemingly disparate pieces, welcoming a comparison to a Rubik’s Cube ®.⁹ When one proverbially turns over and rotates the parts of the water puzzle to

^{4A} See N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-19 (West 1978).

⁵ See generally N.M. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, *supra* note 2.

⁶ See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-2-16, 72-7-1, 72-2-18, 72-4-17 (West 2015).

⁷ See, e.g., *Lion's Gate Water v. D'Antonio*, 2009-NMSC-057, ¶¶ 28-29, 147 N.M. 523, 226 P.3d 622 (examining the scope of district water court's review of State Engineer's denial of application to appropriate water).

⁸ § 72-4-17.

⁹

the side where they belong—sides being the three components of the State Engineer, Water Court or Adjudication Court—eventually a pattern will emerge in which each piece falls into place within the function of that respective side or component. In fact, some pieces may fit on several sides and have multiple functions. Like the Rubik’s Cube ®, the genius of this New Mexico water puzzle is that when all the pieces fall into place, a sensical order or process of water rights administration does emerge, despite the initial confusion.

We begin the quest of solving the water puzzle by first reviewing the history of the development of water rights administration and adjudication laws in New Mexico.

II. A BRIEF AND GENERAL HISTORY

A. The Development of Water Rights Administration Law in New Mexico.

New Mexico’s statutory scheme has long contemplated the existence of multiple roles for governing water administration and adjudication.^{9A} The New Mexico Legislature enacted the state’s Water Code in 1907, predating New Mexico’s statehood by five years.¹⁰ The original Water Code was an adaptation of the water law that then existed in the state of Colorado.¹¹ The original title to the Water Code characterized it as “[a]n act to conserve and regulate the use and distribution of the waters of New Mexico, to create the office of territorial engineer, to create a board of water commissioners, and for other purposes.”¹² Section 12 of the Act clarified that the

^{9A}

¹⁰ *State ex. rel v. Davis*, 1957-NMSC-102, ¶ 7, 63 N.M. 322, 319 P.2d 207; U.S. NAT. ARCHIVES, NEW MEXICO AND ARIZONA STATEHOOD ANNIVERSARY (1912-2012), <https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/nm-az-statehood> (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).

¹¹ *Lindsey v. McClure*, 136 F.2d 65, 69 (10th Cir. 1943) (recognizing “Colorado and New Mexico have the same basic water law”).

¹² *Pueblo of Isleta v. Tondre*, 1913-NMSC-067, ¶ 3, 18 N.M. 388, 137 P. 86.

territorial engineer, or State Engineer, “shall have the supervision of the apportionment of water in this territory according to the licenses issued by him and his predecessors and the adjudications of the courts.”¹³ This demonstrates that since its inception, the Water Code has required a license or permit from the State Engineer for any new appropriation of water.¹⁴

Then in 1911, four years after the Water Code’s enactment, the New Mexico Constitution declared that the State’s unappropriated water belonged to the public and was available for beneficial use, a critical ownership concept discussed in depth later in this paper.¹⁵ This declaration was not novel in concept, but rather it incorporated prior existing law that had always been the rule and practice under Spanish and Mexican regimes, under whom New Mexico had existed prior to statehood.¹⁶ Thus, while still reserving a substantial role for the State Engineer, the New Mexico Constitution defined the negative parameters of authority with respect to unclaimed waters.¹⁷

The original Water Code also contemplated the concept of exclusive jurisdiction for adjudication courts under Section 21, Laws 1907, Code 15, Chapter 49 (what is now in New Mexico Statutes Annotated, section 72-4-17).^{17A} Specifically, the Water Code allowed “[t]he

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ *See id.*

¹⁵ N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; *Davis*, 319 P.2d at 212.

¹⁶ *State ex rel. v. Red River Valley Co.*, 1945-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 20-21, 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421.

¹⁷ Despite state and federal law being very clear that “the States have the control of water within their boundaries,” federal judges continue to question whether a state has the power to control its own water. *See California v. U.S.*, 438 U.S. 645, 678 (1978). In *State ex rel.*, a retired federal judge sitting on New Mexico Court of Appeals even went so far as to hold that a state has *no power* to control the water within its boundaries. *State ex rel. v. U.S.*, 2018-NMCA-053, ¶ 11, 425 P.3d 723. According to Judge Black, because water “can move in interstate commerce,” it is “ultimately subject to the control of the federal, not the state, government.” *Id.* This is erroneous and flies in the face of one hundred and fifty years of federal and state precedence, as pointed out in the State Engineer’s Motion to Reconsider. *See generally* S-1-SC-37068 (“[T]he Opinion fails to follow this Court’s long-established water law precedents regarding the State’s ownership or and regulatory control over all surface and groundwater within New Mexico.”). Regardless of the ultimate outcome, however, the Court’s holding illustrates the importance of scholarship in the area of water law. Failure to understand these fundamental principles could prevent the states from effectively protecting their rights in future water litigation.

^{17A} N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-17 (West 1978).

court in which any suit involving the adjudication of water rights” to have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear all questions concerning the adjudication of water rights within the involved stream system.¹⁸ Following the enactment of the Water Code, a number of cases specifically referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts handling the final adjudication of water rights.¹⁹ During this period of time (1907–1988), the term “adjudication court” referred to any district court to whom the adjudication case was “properly brought” in that particular district under section 72-4-17.²⁰ This later evolved into a specialized adjudication court (“Adjudication Court”) with a designated judge appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.²¹

Recognizing the constraints placed on water availability during drought conditions in the state, in 2003, the legislature provided new authority to the State Engineer to administer water in accordance with the water rights priorities recorded with the office or declared.²² This law required the State Engineer to adopt rules for priority administration to supervise the physical distribution of water rights so as to not interfere with adjudications, and to enforce priorities “so as to create no increased depletions.”²³ This legislation recognized that no provision relieved the State Engineer of his duty to administer water pending adjudication completion, despite the State Engineer’s broad powers and central role in triggering a system-wide adjudication of water rights through the courts.²⁴ Ultimately, this legislation acknowledges that while the water adjudication process may be slow, the State Engineer may administer water allocations and

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *See, e.g.,* El Paso & R. I. Ry. Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Fifth Jud. Dist., El Paso & R. I. Ry. Co. v. Dist. Court of Fifth Judicial Dist. Within & for Chaves County, 1931-NMSC-055, ¶¶151–122, 36 N.M. 94, 8 P.2d 1064; Pub. Serv. Co. v. Reynolds, 1960-NMSC-137, ¶¶ 28-30, 68 N.M. 54, 358 P.2d 621 (holding that state engineer did not have authority to adjudicate water rights because that authority is reserved for a court of competent jurisdiction).

²⁰ §72-4-17

²¹ *See* N.M. R. CIV. P. DIST. CT. 1-071.5.

²² N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-9.1 (West 2003).

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ *Id.*; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-17 (West 1978).

adopt rules for priority administration in the interim.²⁵ This piece of legislation helps to harmonize two components of the water law puzzle with respect to the administrative process and adjudication courts, insofar as the State Engineer ensures smooth distribution of existing rights while ultimate outcomes pend in the Adjudication Court.

Next, on January 27, 2004, the Supreme Court established the Water Court, the third component of our puzzle.^{25A} A Water Court arises by way of a Water Court Division within each judicial district, with a sitting judge designated as a water judge by Supreme Court appointment.²⁶ Each water judge (hereinafter referred to as “Water Judge” or “Water Court”) receives cases “involving water law issues arising in each respective district,” while at the same time maintaining the other typical district court dockets.²⁷ Notably, and confusingly, the Order did not distinguish or differentiate the scope of jurisdictional authority or duty among Water Courts, the Adjudication Court, or the State Engineer.²⁸ In December of that same year, the State Engineer promulgated a new set of regulations known as the Active Water Resource Management (“AWRM”) to provide for priority administration.²⁹ AWRM was game-changing and quickly became the subject of litigation over its constitutionality and the legislature’s intent.³⁰

Despite the evolution of the water law components and authority up to this point, sometimes concurrently (such as the Water Courts and AWRM), a noticeable lack of a formal

²⁵ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-9.1.

^{25A} In the Matter of the Establishment of a Water Ct. Structure for N. M., Order No. 04-8110 1 (Jan. 27, 2004).

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ *See id.*

²⁹ Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 4, 289 P.3d 1232.

³⁰ *See* Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio, 2011-NMCA-015, ¶ 2, 149 N.M. 394, 249 P.3d 932, *rev’d*, Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC-039, 289 P.3d 1232.

nomenclature declaration and defined roles led to ambiguity and legal challenges.^{30A} In fact, the first express reference to the distinction between a Water Court and an Adjudication Court in a formal pronouncement of law did not arrive until 2007.³¹ In that year, the Supreme Court approved Rules of Civil Procedure 1-071.1 through 1-071.5, governing the process for statutory stream system adjudications.³² Specifically, Rule 1-017.5 on excusals or recusals of a water judge distinguishes between the two components with regard to how “[e]ach *water judge in each judicial district, including judges assigned to stream adjudications*” (emphasis added) cannot be peremptorily excused.³³ Thus, distinctions inadvertently began to emerge among the three water law components, notwithstanding the absence of the same in the original Order.

Environmental factors have also played a critical role in the evolution of New Mexico water law. During the sustained period of drought in 2007 and 2008, the legislature wrestled with the issue of how to best administer this scarce resource. Due to the then-unclear process for adjudicating water rights, the legislature sought direction from a comparative study of other Western states’ water laws.³⁴ To oversee this ambitious endeavor, in June 2007, the Interim Legislative Water and Natural Resources Committee created an adjudication subcommittee to study adjudication reform.³⁵ Three months later, the Administrative Offices of the Court provided the Legislative Finance Committee a memo surveying adjudication laws of other Western states.^{35b} After months of surveying neighboring states’ water laws, the resulting memo concluded that there does not exist one correct procedure for adjudicating water rights.³⁶

^{30A}

³¹ See N.M. R. CIV. P. DIST. CT. 1-071.1-1-071.5.

³² See *id.*

³³ N.M. R. CIV. P. DIST. CT. 1-071.5 (emphasis added).

³⁴ N.M. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE COURTS, WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 1-2 (Sept. 14, 2007), <https://www.ose.state.nm.us/NMAC/Adjudication/AOC-AdjudicationWhitePaper.pdf>.

³⁵ See *id.*

^{35b} *Id.* at 1.

³⁶ *Id.* at 1-2.

Furthermore, the memo characterized New Mexico’s procedure as haphazard, in part based upon its gradual development starting in 1907 and its use of the same procedural rules as regular civil lawsuits.³⁷ Ultimately, and unfortunately, the study and memorandum did not prove fruitful as no agreements were reached.³⁸

In 2012, a landmark case further clarified administrative and adjudicative functions. The case arose as a constitutional challenge to the State Engineer’s adoption of the AWRM regulations, and the Supreme Court of New Mexico settled the matter. In *Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio* (hereinafter “*Tri-State Generation*”), the Court of Appeals initially held that the legislature was barred under the Separation of Powers Doctrine from delegating authority to the State Engineer to make administrative determinations that considered any factors beyond the licenses [or permits] issued by the State Engineer, and adjudications of the courts.³⁹ The Supreme Court reversed the appellate ruling, instead holding that the State Engineer can still administratively manage water rights priorities before entering a final *inter se* adjudication, notwithstanding the essential function that statutory adjudication serves in final water right determinations.⁴⁰ In essence, the case allowed, in a time of a water shortage, the State Engineer can continue administratively managing water allocations and may further consider other factors in a quasi-judicial manner as necessary, even during an ongoing adjudication to determine final water rights.⁴¹ *Tri-State Generation* thus further defined the State Engineer component with respect to its flexible and rapid managerial role while final adjudications pend.

³⁷ *See id.* at 4-5.

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ 249 P.3d at 944.

⁴⁰ *Tri-State Generation*, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 44.

⁴¹ *See id.* at ¶¶ 1-3.

III. SUMMARY OF LAW GRANTING AUTHORITY

A. THE STATE ENGINEER

i. The Water Code.

The authority of the State Engineer to administer the waters of New Mexico starts and ends with the aforementioned Water Act of 1907 (“Water Code”), now reflected in section 72-1-1 *et seq.*⁴² As previously discussed, over the years, the legislature enlarged, clarified, and amended the duties of the State Engineer as it saw fit.^{42b} Water-use leasing, underground water administration, establishing a hearing process, and mine dewatering include some of the matters that have come to fall under the umbrella of the State Engineer’s authority.⁴³ For the purposes of this paper, two aspects of the administrative process are paramount to understanding how the State Engineer fits within the statutory framework. First, the administrative duties of State Engineer apply to all appropriated waters within the State.⁴⁴ Second, all appropriations require an administrative permit issued by the State Engineer.⁴⁵

ii. Active Water Resource Management (AWRM).

As briefly described in the above section, the 2003 enactment of section 72-2-9.1 gave the State Engineer new authority to administer water in accordance with recorded or declared water rights priorities.⁴⁶ As upheld in *Tri-State Generation*, this law allows the State Engineer to

⁴² N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1-1 to 72-18-70 (1978).

^{42b} See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-16, -6-5, -12-3.

⁴³ N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-2-16, -12-3.

⁴⁴ N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1-1, -2-9.

⁴⁵ See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-1 (governing surface waters), -12-3(A) (governing underground waters).

⁴⁶ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-9.1 (West 2003).

use AWRM to adopt rules for priority administration of permitted appropriations, even while adjudication of those same waters is pending before an adjudication court awaiting a final determination of rights.⁴⁷ In sum, no separation of powers conflict exists with regard to AWRM regulations as they accomplish important water policy objectives of consistent and continuous management and afford the State Engineer flexibility in their execution.^{47b}

B. THE ADJUDICATION COURT:

i. NMSA 1978, Section 72-4-17 (Suits for determination of water rights; parties; hydrographic survey; jurisdiction; unknown claimants).

The Adjudication Court arises directly from statutory authority. Section 72-4-17 bestows the adjudication court with its primary grant and outlines its scope of authority.⁴⁸ This section on the final adjudication of system-wide water rights requires that all claimants identified by a hydrographic survey be joined as parties to an adjudication filed by the office of the State Engineer.⁴⁹ In turn, filing an adjudication suit triggers exclusive jurisdiction: “[t]he court in which any suit involving the adjudication of water rights may be properly brought shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions necessary for the adjudication of all water rights within the stream system involved”⁵⁰ Upon the adjudication of a water right, the Adjudication Court incorporates the final decree into a subfile order, which is retained in the claimant’s court file to document the adjudicated water rights.^{50b} The subfile order establishes the required elements—priority, amount, purpose, periods of use, and place of use—of the claimant’s water right as determined by a final hydrographic survey.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Tri-State, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 61; N.M. Code R. § 19.26.2.1-11 (2005).

^{47b} Tri-State, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 61.

⁴⁸ N.M. STAT. ANN § 72-4-17 (1978).

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ *Id.*

^{50b} N.M. STAT. ANN § 72-4-19 (1978).

⁵¹ *Id.*

C. THE WATER COURTS.

i. New Mexico Constitution, Art. XVI, Section 5.

The genesis of Water Court authority is born from several sources. First, the New Mexico Constitution provides for *de novo* appeals from a decision, an act, or refusal to act of any state executive (State Engineer) in matters relating to water rights.⁵² The Water Code contained the specific process for a *de novo* appeal in section 72-7-1.⁵³ For our purposes, the important point is that Water Courts serve as venues for these appeals.

ii. Supreme Court Order of January 27, 2004.

The Supreme Court Order established a particular “Water Court Division” within the judiciary.⁵⁴ Consequently, each court district now has a designated “water law judge” who is assigned cases involving water law issues arising in that specific judicial district.⁵⁵ These judges also preside over cases in other areas of law, unlike the judge appointed to oversee the Adjudication Court.⁵⁶

iii. Water Code, Sections 72-1-1, et al.

The Water Code expands on the foundational authority of the above sources. Throughout the Water Code, there are multiple references to “district judge,”⁵⁷ “district court,”⁵⁸ “the court having jurisdiction thereof,”⁵⁹ and “adjudications of the courts.”

⁵² N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.

⁵³ See N.M. STAT. ANN § 72-7-1 (1978) (regarding appeal to district court; procedure).

⁵⁴ SUP. CT. N.M., No. 04-8110, IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WATER COURT STRUCTURE FOR NEW MEXICO 1 (Jan. 27, 2004).

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ See *id.*

⁵⁷ See N.M. STAT. ANN § 72-1-7 (1978).

⁵⁸ See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 72-2-15, -7-1, -2-18 (1978) (regarding compliance order-injunction), -12-10, -12-14 (regarding licensing action), -18-4 (establishing flood control districts).

⁵⁹ See N.M. STAT. ANN § 72-8-1 (1978) (regarding offenses and penalties).

⁶⁰ Some of these statutes refer to the important appeal process taken from decisions of the State Engineer as authorized by the state Constitution. Meanwhile, a number of the statutes authorize the district court to act in ancillary matters, such as the enforcement of penalties and compliance orders, injunctions, licensing actions, and flood zone establishment.⁶¹ Unpacking Water Court powers thus requires a close and contextual reading of the Water Code.

IV. CASE LAW AUTHORITY FURTHER DEFINING JURISDICTION

As outlined above, the State Engineer, the Adjudication Court, and the Water Courts have particularized sources of jurisdictional authority. A body of case law further defining these authoritative grants has evolved over time. For example, cases discussed *supra* explain the parameters of the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to district courts to resolve “matters relating to water rights” arising from any act or omission on the part of the State Engineer.⁶² As a consequence of this case law, a set of principles and/or limitations developed that direct the respective components in the water administration process. We begin with the primary principle in New Mexico’s process of water administration, exclusivity.

A. Adjudication Courts: Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine the Water Rights as to the Elements of Priority, Amount, Purpose, Periods and Places of Use.

To recap, adjudication courts are unique in that they alone have the power to adjudicate final water rights.⁶³ The Water Code still allows the State Engineer to administer water rights outside of the adjudication process based on permits as an inchoate right, a necessary first step in obtaining an adjudicated water right.⁶⁴ However, the State Engineer’s inchoate right of

⁶⁰ See N.M. STAT. ANN § 72-2-9 (1978) (regarding supervising apportionment of waters according to licenses).

⁶¹ See N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 72-1-7, -2-9, -2-15, -2-18, -7-1, -8-1, -12-10, -12-14, -18-4 (1978).

⁶² N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; SUP. CT. N.M., No. 04-8110, IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WATER COURT STRUCTURE FOR NEW MEXICO 1 (Jan. 27, 2004).

⁶³ N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 72-4-17, -4-19 (1978).

⁶⁴ *Id.*

administration only exists in the interim until the Adjudication Court decides final water rights.⁶⁵ In terms of relief, the district court can only resolve disputed administrative decisions to the extent that such orders do not alter, impede, or stand inconsistent with the final adjudications of the water rights.⁶⁶ Currently, only one Adjudication Court exists, and therefore, it is the sole forum for final right determinations.

The case of *El Paso & Rock Island Railway Co. v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District* illustrates why the Adjudication Court maintains the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate final water rights.⁶⁷ The case began with a lawsuit filed in the Lincoln County district court to settle water rights in a general adjudication of all rights in the Bonito stream system.⁶⁸ Shortly thereafter, Chaves County District Court issued an injunction precluding the State Engineer's approval of a new use of the water, with that new use being that the water would be leaving the Bonito watershed.⁶⁹ This watershed normally would have led to the recharge of the distant Roswell artesian basin, making the water's diversion from it contested.⁷⁰ Ultimately, the Supreme Court issued an alternative writ of prohibition against the Chaves county action, and in its opinion noted a problematic clash of courts:

The present case well illustrates the unfortunate results which might follow a divided jurisdiction. The water right asserted by petitioners is now at issue in two courts. To have it upheld in the adjudication suit would be useless if it can be invalidated in the injunction suit. Defendants in the adjudication suit may have rights decreed to them.⁷¹

⁶⁵ See *Tri-State*, 2012-NMSC-039; *Hanson v. Turney*, 2004-NMCA-069, 136 N.M. 1, 94 P.3d 1.

⁶⁶ *Miller Farms v. Verhines*, No. 33,416, 2014 WL 2534812, at *1-2 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014).

⁶⁷ See generally 1931-NMSC-055.

⁶⁸ *Id.* at ¶ 5.

⁶⁹ *Id.* at ¶ 4.

⁷⁰ *Id.*

⁷¹ *Id.* at ¶ 16.

Subsequent cases have continued to uphold the fundamental principle that only an Adjudication Court in a water rights adjudication can determine elements of a final water right.⁷² A separate Water Court or district court cannot alter or affect the water rights over which the Adjudication Court alone has authority to make final.⁷³

B. The State Engineer: There is a distinction between “holders of permits” and “owners of water rights”.⁷⁴

While the Adjudication Court’s exclusive jurisdiction appears simple in concept, the contours of that authority become fuzzy when one considers two factors: (1) the State Engineer’s authority over inchoate water rights during an adjudication, and (2) the Water Court’s authority under the Water Code. We must first examine further the State Engineer’s use of the permitting process to administer interim water rights.

It is well-settled that the State Engineer has general supervision of the waters of the State.⁷⁵ Anyone seeking the right to beneficial use of surface or underground waters must apply to the State Engineer for a “permit.”⁷⁶ However, upon the Adjudication Court’s final adjudication of water rights, said Court will enter a final decree declaring the elements of ownership.⁷⁷ The Adjudication Court will then incorporate the final decree into a subfile order establishing the claimant’s water right as a “license.”⁷⁸ Since all waters belong to the State of New Mexico, a

⁷² See, e.g., *Ulibarri v. Hagan*, 1982-NMSC-101, ¶ 6, 98 N.M. 676, 652 P.2d 226 (dictating that before a district court can dismiss the suit on grounds that an Adjudication Court has exclusive jurisdiction, the district court must be satisfied that the water right at issue was part of the “stream system involved”); *Farms v. Verhines*, WL 2534812, at *3 (persuasive) (limiting pursuant to Section 72–4–17, the district court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the State Engineer to accept petitioners’ declarations regarding their assertions to pre-1907 surface water rights, since a previously filed adjudication of petitioners’ water rights was pending).

⁷³ *Ulibarri*, 1982-NMSC-101, ¶ 6.

⁷⁴ *Hanson v. Turney*, 2004-NMCA-069, ¶ 12 136 N.M. 1, 94 P.3d 1.

⁷⁵ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-1.

⁷⁶ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-1.

⁷⁷ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-19.

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Subfile Final Judgment: Licensed Water Rights filed in D307-CV-2005-0045 on 12/19/16 and issued pursuant to Case Management Order Mandating Basis-Wide Issue Proceeding and Expedited Inter Se proceedings.

license is only issued to the owner of an appropriated water right, as opposed to interim permit holders.⁷⁹ This process is consistent with the distinction between “holders of permits” and “owners of water rights” as illustrated by the case below.”⁸⁰

In *Hanson v. Turney*, a permit holder acquired permits to appropriate waters in 1989 and 1992 for irrigation use.⁸¹ The permit holder drilled two wells, but never put the water to beneficial use, which is the bedrock principle of water right ownership.⁸² Later the permit holder filed two applications requesting a change to subdivision use.⁸³ The State Engineer denied both applications because no water had been put to beneficial use.⁸⁴ Upon affirming the grant of summary judgment for the State Engineer, the Court of Appeals decided the meaning of the statutory term “water right,” and whether it included a “permit to appropriate water, even when no water has been put to beneficial use”⁸⁵

The *Hanson* court began its analysis by noting that “establishing a water right is a process that takes a period of time.”⁸⁶ Accordingly, the court distinguished a water permit as an inchoate right, which “is the necessary first step” in obtaining a water right; a water permit is “the authority to pursue a water right—a conditional but unfulfilled promise on the part of the state to allow the permittee to one day apply the state's water in a particular place and to a specific beneficial use under conditions where the rights of other appropriators will not be impaired.”⁸⁷ The *Hanson* court further pointed out that the legislature distinguished “holders of permits” from

⁷⁹ N.M. CONST., art. XVI, § 2.

⁸⁰ See *Hanson*, 2004-NMCA-069.

⁸¹ *Id.* at ¶ 3.

⁸² *Id.*

⁸³ *Id.*

⁸⁴ *Id.*

⁸⁵ *Id.* at ¶ 6.

⁸⁶ *Hanson*, 2004-NMCA-069, ¶ 8.

⁸⁷ *Id.*

“owners of water rights” in section 72-12-8, which provides that both owners and permit holders forfeit their right if the water is not put to beneficial use.⁸⁸

C. Water Courts: Equitable Relief is Within the Penumbra of Jurisdiction

The Water Court may apply equitable relief in absence of an active administrative or adjudicatory process. While Adjudication Court exclusivity appears to initially limit Water Court jurisdiction, the Supreme Court Order authorizes such courts to preside over matters “involving water law issues arising in each respective district.”⁸⁹ In fact, the law predating the establishment of the Water Court supports the district courts’ power to entertain equitable actions, so long as such actions will not impair or impede an adjudication process. Such actions are encouraged where it will assist the State Engineer in the administrative process.

i. Injunctions

Injunctive relief is one type of equitable remedy a Water Court may administer. In *Carlsbad Irrigation District v. Ford*, an irrigation district sought to enjoin the riparian owners’ alleged unlawful appropriation of water from the river above the district’s reservoirs.⁹⁰ As a defense, the riparian owners asserted that they applied with the State Engineer to appropriate waters from the river.⁹¹ The Supreme Court noted that the pending administrative permit claim might support defendants’ claim that they had not proceeded in a willful manner, but since the permits had not yet been issued, the application established no rights in them.⁹² In an attempt to contest venue, the defendants argued they were diverting water in Chaves County, while only the reservoir sat

⁸⁸ *Id.* at ¶ 12; *see also* N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-8(A).

⁸⁹ In the Matter of the Establishment of a Water Ct. Structure for N. M., Order No. 04-8110 1 (Jan. 27, 2004).

⁹⁰ 1942-NMSC-042, ¶ 4, 46 N.M. 335, 128 P.2d 1047.

⁹¹ *Id.* at ¶ 18.

⁹² *Id.*

in Eddy County.⁹³ The Supreme Court reasoned that venue was properly situated in Eddy County because the lawsuit did not concern adjudication of water rights in a stream system.⁹⁴ The Court went on to enjoin the defendants from unlawfully appropriating any waters from the Pecos River, including flood waters.⁹⁵

The holding in *Carlsbad Irrigation District v. Ford* is consistent with section 72-5-39 of the Water Code. This section allows use of public waters only in accordance with the laws of New Mexico, so long as that use “shall in no way be construed to affect the existing right of a court of equity in the exercise of its general equity powers to grant relief to the state of New Mexico by injunction or otherwise.”⁹⁶ This case demonstrates that absent an adjudication suit, the Supreme Court acknowledged the district courts’ role in resolving matters “involving water law issues arising in their specific district,” and further recognized that the State Engineer’s interim actions may affect claims of injunctive relief.⁹⁷

ii. Declaratory Judgments, Laches and Estoppel

Additional forms of equitable relief remain open to Water Courts. In the *Village of Wagon Mound v. The Mora Trust*—another decision prior to the establishment of Water Courts and prior to a system-wide adjudication—a district court grappled with the issue of enforcing a water contract between the village of Wagon Mound and a private trust.⁹⁸ The village’s sole source of water was a spring located on the trust’s property.⁹⁹ The village and prior owner predicated the

⁹³ *Id.* at ¶ 24.

⁹⁴ *Id.*

⁹⁵ *Id.* at ¶¶ 39-40.

⁹⁶ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-39.

⁹⁷ In the Matter of the Establishment of a Water Ct. Structure for N. M., Order No. 04-8110 1 (Jan. 27, 2004); *see* *Carlsbad*, 1942-NMSC-042.

⁹⁸ *See generally* 2003-NMCA-035, 133 N.M. 373, 62 P.3d 1255.

⁹⁹ *Id.* ¶ 4.

source and access to the water on a 65-year-old contract between them.¹⁰⁰ In that contract, the village had a perpetual right to take and divert water from the spring.¹⁰¹ Neither the landowner nor the village ever filed any record of this contract with the State Engineer, nor did they seek to clarify their rights to the spring waters by an adjudication or filing.¹⁰²

A subsequent buyer to the land filed a Declaration of Ownership with the State Engineer and obtained a license several decades later.¹⁰³ The Mora Trust arose after the death of this subsequent buyer.¹⁰⁴ The heirs to the trust then sought to hold the water contract invalid and unenforceable.¹⁰⁵ The village in turn filed a declaratory action with the district court to hold the contract valid, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the village.¹⁰⁶ The village argued before the appellate court that it had water rights under the contract.¹⁰⁷

The appellate court noted that the State Engineer had not permitted or licensed the village any right to appropriate water, but rather viewed the village's rights to access and divert the water as a contractual right.¹⁰⁸ The village countered with the argument that there had been no transfer of place of use, purpose, or point of diversion regarding pre- or post-1907 rights and, therefore, there was no need to invoke the State Engineer's jurisdiction.¹⁰⁹ The appellate court found that the village did not have water rights; however, it did affirm the district court's order in declaring the contract valid.^{109A} This ruling ensured that the village had the perpetual right to use

¹⁰⁰ *Id.* ¶¶ 5-6.

¹⁰¹ *Id.* ¶¶ 6-7.

¹⁰² *Id.* ¶ 10.

¹⁰³ Village of Wagon Mound, 2003-NMCA-035, ¶¶ 11-12.

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* ¶ 13.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* ¶ 16.

¹⁰⁶ *Id.* ¶¶ 17, 23.

¹⁰⁷ *See id.* ¶¶ 28-30.

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*

¹⁰⁹ Village of Wagon Mound, 2003-NMCA-035, ¶ 31.

^{109A} *Id.* at 1255.

of the water along with the right-of-way necessary for the water to reach the village.¹¹⁰ The village also argued a second equitable claim, the doctrine of laches, against the trust's counterclaims.^{110A} The village asserted that, under undisputed facts, laches should attach to prevent the trust from challenging the enforceability of the contractual obligation through a stale defense.¹¹¹ The appellate court affirmed the village's use of laches.¹¹²

Although the *Village of Wagon Mound* court made its decision on the basis of contractual rights rather than on established water rights,^{112A} the case is nevertheless a water rights case. The decisions in both *Ford* and *Village of Wagon Mound* are consistent with the dictates of Section 72-5-39, which states that laws governing water may not “be construed to affect the existing right of a court of equity in the exercise of its general equity powers to grant relief to the state of New Mexico by injunction or otherwise.”¹¹³ Moreover, both of these cases involved district court decisions rendered in their now-known capacity as “Water Courts,” since no system-wide final adjudications were at issue; rather, the parties in these cases had either permitted rights, pending applications for permitted rights, or no permitted rights.^{113A}

iii. The Declaratory Judgment Act: An Alternative Means of Presenting Controversies to Courts Already Having Appropriate Jurisdiction Without Enlarging Jurisdiction.

¹¹⁰ *See id.*

^{110A} *Id.* ¶ 39. at 1264.

¹¹¹ *Id.* ¶¶ 39-42.

¹¹² *Id.* ¶ 36.

^{112A} *Village of Wagon Mound*, 2003-NMCA-035, 1255.

¹¹³ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-39 (2021); *see generally Village of Wagon Mound*, 2003-NMCA-035; *Ford*, 128 P.2d 1047 (standing for the proposition that because the waters belong to the State, any relief granted to parties over water rights permitted by the State Engineer is really a grant of relief to the State in further administration of such rights).

^{113A} *Village of Wagon Mound*, 2003-NMCA-035, ¶¶ 28-29; *Ford*, 128 P.2d at 1047, 1049.

As described in the aforementioned cases, declaratory actions provide another mechanism to settle party differences in water disputes.¹¹⁴ In *Smith v. City of Santa Fe*, the Supreme Court explicitly held that a declaratory judgment action may provide an alternative means of challenging an administrative entity's authority, as long as such action is not used to circumvent established procedures for seeking judicial review of a municipality's administrative decisions.¹¹⁵

While *Smith* involved a municipal water code rather than the statutory Water Code, it remains instructive to water cases for purposes of determining when a party may pursue a declaratory judgment instead of first exhausting administrative remedies.¹¹⁶ The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies requires that the litigant complete the administrative process with the State Engineer after initiating the process.^{116A} This doctrine essentially bars a litigant from forum shopping by filing a declaratory action to secure a more favorable result from a Water Court.¹¹⁷

This is the situation addressed in the *Headen* case, where the plaintiff filed an application with the State Engineer to change his claimed rights' point of diversion as well as the place and purpose of use.¹¹⁸ The State Engineer denied the plaintiff's application, deciding that he did not, in fact, possess any valid water rights to transfer.¹¹⁹ Consequently, the plaintiff requested an

¹¹⁴ *Smith v. City of Santa Fe*, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 15, 24, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300, 305, 307 (allowing a plaintiff to use declaratory judgment to challenge city authority to regulate the permitting of domestic water wells as that fell within the Declaratory Judgment Act, while prohibiting a second plaintiff from circumventing the already-initiated administrative process by filing a declaratory action).

¹¹⁵ *Id.* ¶ 1.

¹¹⁶ *Id.* ¶ 27; *see also* *Headen v. D'Antonio*, 2011-NMCA-058, ¶ 11, 149 N.M. 667, 253 P.3d 957, 961.

^{116A} *Smith*, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 26.

¹¹⁷ *See Headen*, 2011-NMCA-058, ¶ 1 (holding that a declaratory judgment action filed prior to an administrative hearing was premature due to appellant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies).

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

¹¹⁹ *Id.* ¶ 2.

administrative hearing.¹²⁰ However, prior to the hearing, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in district court to establish the validity of his water rights.¹²¹ In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, the appellate court characterized the administrative proceedings as a forfeiture determination under the Water Code, which required the plaintiff to proceed through the administrative process.¹²²

In *Headen*, the appellate court further noted that “declaratory judgment actions ‘should be limited to purely legal issues that do not require fact finding by the administrative entity.’”¹²³ Accordingly, *Headen* follows *Smith* which cautioned against using a declaratory judgment action to challenge or review administrative actions if such an approach would: (1) foreclose administrative entity fact finding, (2) discourage reliance on any special administrative expertise, (3) disregard an exclusive statutory scheme for review of administrative decisions, or (4) “circumvent procedural or substantive limitations that would otherwise limit review through means other than a declaratory judgment action.”¹²⁴

Granted, there may be occasions when a declaratory action includes a request for supplemental relief (under section 44-6-9), or where the determination of the parties' legal relations may require some fact finding.¹²⁵ In such instances, however, Water Courts must be cognizant of the cautionary language from the *Smith* and *Headen* cases, which direct courts to defer to administrative proceedings, including the necessary fact finding for which

¹²⁰ *Id.* ¶ 3.

¹²¹ *Id.*

¹²² *Id.* ¶ 9.

¹²³ *Id.* ¶ 14 (quoting *Smith*, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 16, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300, 305).

¹²⁴ *Id.* (quoting *Smith*, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 15).

¹²⁵ See *State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mears*, 1974-NMSC-070, 86 N.M. 510, 525 P.2d 870 (determining that trial court findings supported its determination of extent of the water rights to which landowners were entitled in the context of a declaratory action by the State Engineer seeking to declare that landowners had not perfected underground water rights on their lands).

administrative agencies are best suited.¹²⁶ However, certain fact-finding inquiries involving disputes over the individual rights of litigants may fare better in a Water Court.^{126A}

D. Water Courts and Hybrid Functions: A Puzzling Affair

i. The State Engineer Can Administratively Resolve Disputes on Water Rights Priorities Before a Final *Inter Se* Adjudication.

To review the basic framework crafted in preceding sections, the State Engineer has the authority to administer permitted water rights.^{126B} In 2003, the State Engineer’s authority expanded to allow water administration according to the water rights priorities recorded with the office or as declared.¹²⁷ *Tri-State Generation* confirmed the State Engineer’s authority to adopt rules for priority administration of permitted appropriations, even while an adjudication of those same waters is pending before the Adjudication Court.¹²⁸ The key message of *Tri-State Generation* remains that during a pending and protracted judicial process to adjudicate final water rights, the State Engineer can still administer the permitted water rights exclusively through the administrative process.¹²⁹

Given that water rights are merely usufructuary—in other words, belong to the State—they are subject to public servitudes and are thus “incapable of full ownership and [are] subject to constraints that [they] be used nonwastefully, reasonably, beneficially, etc.”¹³⁰ In *Tri-State Generation*, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the State Engineer’s regulation of water rights was adjudicatory in nature:

¹²⁶ *Smith*, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 15-16; *Headen*, 2011-NMCA-058, ¶ 14.

^{126A} See discussion *infra* Section IV.D.ii.

^{126B} See discussion *infra* Section III.A.ii.

¹²⁷ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-9.1.

¹²⁸ See 2012-NMSC-039, ¶¶ 25-26, 289 P.3d 1232, 1239; see also NMAC 19.26.2.3.

¹²⁹ See generally 2012-NMSC-039.

¹³⁰ *Id.* ¶ 41 (“All water within the state, whether above or beneath the surface of the ground belongs to the state, which authorizes its use, and there is no ownership in the corpus of the water but the use thereof may be acquired and the basis of such acquisition is beneficial use.... The state as owner of water has the right to prescribe how it may be used.”)

We agree with Tri-State that the State Engineer lacks the authority to adjudicate water rights But whether the State Engineer may adjudicate water rights is not the issue before us; rather, we are addressing the State Engineer's statutory authority to administer water outside of the adjudication process.”¹³¹

Moreover, the *Tri-State Generation* Court recognized the unique nature of the State Engineer's delegated duties; namely, obligations already involving water administration based upon extra-adjudicatory priority determinations, which, in turn, often place the State Engineer in a position of issuing *de facto* factual determinations.¹³² Given this somewhat hybrid function, the Court noted that it was proper for the legislature to vest an agency with quasi-judicial functions.¹³³

ii. Certain Factual Determinations Necessary for the State Engineer’s Water Administration Require Water Court Resolution.

While *Tri-State Generation* did not raise the issue of a Water Court’s authority, the Supreme Court clearly relied upon cases establishing that an administrative agency in the exercise of its police powers has authority to resolve some factual disputes.¹³⁴ Though not explored in that case, certain types of such factual disputes are not well suited for administrative relief, but instead best fit under the purview of judicial resolution.

¹³¹ *Id.* ¶ 32.

¹³² *Id.* ¶ 34 (citing *Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist.*, 1958-NMSC-131, ¶¶ 7, 44, 65 N.M. 59, 332 P.2d 465, 466, 471 (1958) (rejecting the argument that the State Engineer's denial of a permit to change the place of diversion was a *de facto* adjudication, stating, “[I]t is true that the State Engineer cannot conduct a proceeding to adjudicate the priorities of water rights. However, each time a permit is granted, the State Engineer has to consider all prior appropriations to determine whether or not there are any unappropriated waters. To that extent, he is required to consider prior appropriations.”).

¹³³ *Id.* ¶ 35 (citing *Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer*, 1986-NMSC-075, ¶ 5, 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381, 1382–83 (1986) (overruling *State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem*, 1957-NMSC-075, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 in holding that the Legislature can grant authority under the Workmen's Compensation Act to an administrative agency to address individual rights as a quasi-judicial body)); *see also* *New Energy Econ., Inc. v. Shoobridge*, 2010-NMSC-049, ¶ 14, 149 N.M. 42, 243 P.3d 746 (2010) (Within the separation of powers scheme, “we have recognized the Legislature's power to delegate both adjudicative and rule-making power to administrative agencies.”).

¹³⁴ *Id.* (e.g., boards regulating common carriers, transportation, telephone, utility rates, liquor control, etc.).

a. *Fellows v. Shultz*

Such was the case in *Fellows v. Shultz*. There, the Supreme Court delineated the differences in factual resolutions best handled by administrative agencies and those better suited for the courts in the context of an application to change a well location.¹³⁵ The Court clarified that “the legislature, in exercising its police powers, may confer certain ‘quasi-judicial’ powers on administrative agencies with regard to laws affecting the general public, *but . . . such powers do not extend to determinations of rights and liabilities between individuals.*”¹³⁶

Specifically, *Fellows* involved a separation of powers challenge to New Mexico Water Code section 75-11-7, which pertains to applications requesting permission from the State Engineer to relocate water wells.¹³⁷ Upon objection or denial of a permit, the statute allowed an applicant to file an action for a district court hearing as an originally docketed case.¹³⁸ In relevant part, that statute contemplated an *original proceeding* in district court without first requiring an appeal, prior review *de novo*, or the State Engineer’s act or refusal to act.¹³⁹ Ultimately, *Fellows* struck down the statutory provision because it unconstitutionally violated the separation of powers, grounding the decision in the distinct functions of the courts and administrative agencies:

The crucial question here, however, is whether a proceeding which has long been established as administrative in nature can be made judicial in nature by the legislative act of removing such proceeding from the jurisdiction of an administrative body and placing it within the original jurisdiction of the courts. . . . *[I]t must follow that, just as the commission cannot perform a judicial function, neither can the court perform an*

¹³⁵ See *Fellows v. Shultz*, 1970-NMSC-071, ¶¶ 3-6, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141, 143.

¹³⁶ *Id.* ¶ 4 (citing *State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem*, 1957-NMSC-075, ¶ 4, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069, 1070 (1957); *State v. Kelly*, 1921-NMSC-073, ¶ 26, 27 N.M. 412, 202 P. 524, 530 (1921)) (emphasis added).

¹³⁷ *Fellows*, 1970-NMSC-071, ¶ 6.

¹³⁸ *Id.*

¹³⁹ *Id.* ¶ 13.

*administrative one.*¹⁴⁰

As the Supreme Court noted in *Smith*, a court should resist a legal challenge to, or review of, administrative actions if such an action (1) would foreclose any necessary fact-finding by the administrative entity, (2) discourage reliance on any special expertise that might exist at the administrative level, (3) disregard an exclusive statutory scheme for the review of administrative decisions, or (4) circumvent procedural or substantive limitations placed on reviewing administrative action.¹⁴¹ At the same time, however, an administrative agency must avoid making factual determinations involving individuals' rights and liabilities where such determinations are not a core function of the agency's police powers.¹⁴² Thus, an agency must strike a careful balance when fact finding to avoid exceeding its authority.

Water Courts are also the proper forum to determine the elements of a *permitted* water right between litigants, as opposed to the elements of a water right on final adjudication.^{142A} Water Courts frequently resolve disputes as to the use of a common well (place of use), the quantity of acre-feet placed into beneficial use (amount), or simply the ownership of the permitted water right.^{142B} Permitted water right issues are quite often local and reach the Water Court as a State Engineer appeal or referral arising from a private dispute.^{142C} These issues can also arise through private parties' disputes in court.^{142D} For example, a party may challenge the

¹⁴⁰ *Id.* ¶¶ 8-9 (citing *Cont'l Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n*, 1962-NMSC-062, ¶ 28, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809, 819) (emphasis added).

¹⁴¹ *See Smith*, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 15 (discussing limitations on the use of declaratory judgment actions to review the propriety of administrative actions).

¹⁴² *See Fellows*, 1970-NMSC-071, ¶ 4.

^{142A} *See, e.g., Smith*, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 7 (Water Court had jurisdiction to address claim for declaratory relief but not to grant relief).

^{142B} *See, e.g., Hydro Res. Corp. v. Gray*, 2007-NMSC-061, ¶¶ 25-27, 143 N.M. 142, 173 P.3d 749, 757 (beneficial use); *Fellows*, 1970-NMSC-071, ¶ 1 (well location); *Chavez v. Gutierrez*, 1950-NMSC-004, ¶ 1, 54 N.M. 76, 213 P.2d 597, 597-98 (water ownership).

^{142C} *See, e.g., Fellows*, 1970-NMSC-071, ¶ 1 (statute challenged by both state engineer and private parties).

^{142D} *See In re Gregory Rock H. Ranch, L.L.C.*, 339 B.R. 255, 257 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2006) (discussing New Mexico's Water Court structure and remanding water rights matter to Water Court).

State Engineer’s archived documentation to support a permitted water right as a forgery or contend a transactional document lacks consideration. Documents leading to a claim of permitted water rights—contracts of sale, last wills bequeathing water rights, quitclaim deeds, assignments, etc.—are the typical supporting documents that may be questioned or challenged. As discussed *supra* in *Fellows* and *Smith*, these types of issues may be beyond the special expertise and outside the core function of the State Engineer, thereby necessitating resolution of the parties’ rights and liabilities in a Water Court.¹⁴³

b. *Moongate Water Co. v. Dona Ana Mutual Water Consumers Association*

Moongate Water Company, Inc. v. Dona Ana Mutual Water Consumers Association, currently on appeal, showcases the issue of which factual matters a Water Court may resolve.¹⁴⁴ In *Moongate*, two water companies claimed the same eighty-two acre-feet per year of water (“afy”) originating from the same source: Westmoreland.¹⁴⁵ Westmoreland originally leased and contracted with Moongate to provide water services to its subdivision.¹⁴⁶ Westmoreland allowed Moongate to serve the subdivision with Westmoreland’s unperfected, but permitted, water rights.¹⁴⁷ Moongate put eighty-two afy of water rights to beneficial use in the subdivision in 1997.¹⁴⁸ Moongate’s contract with Westmoreland expired two years later.¹⁴⁹ In 2002, Westmoreland then sold the same eighty-two afy of perfected water rights to Dona Ana, which immediately filed a Declaration of Ownership with the State Engineer.¹⁵⁰ A dispute later arose

¹⁴³ See generally *Smith*, 2007-NMSC-055; *Fellows*, 1970-NMSC-071

¹⁴⁴ *Moongate Water Co. v. Dona Ana Mut. Water Consumers Assoc.*, D-307-CV-2013-01480 (N.M. Dist.) (pending on appeal: A-1-CA-38589).

¹⁴⁵ *Id.*

¹⁴⁶ *Id.*

¹⁴⁷ *Id.*

¹⁴⁸ *Id.*

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*

¹⁵⁰ *Id.*

when, under *Hydro Resources Corp. v. Gray*, Moongate claimed the same permitted water rights through the doctrine of beneficial use.¹⁵¹ A seminal authority on this doctrine, *Hydro Resources* established that the person who develops water by placing the water to beneficial use becomes the owner of the water right via a lease.¹⁵² The *Hydro Resources* court determined that the lessor could have placed language in the lease to retain the water rights had he so desired.¹⁵³

In *Moongate*, upon objection to Dona Ana's request to transfer the point of discharge, the State Engineer hearing officer referred the issue of ownership to the Third Judicial District Court, the appropriate Water Court forum.¹⁵⁴ In response, Dona Ana challenged the Water Court's jurisdiction, contending that only the Adjudication Court could determine ownership of a water right.¹⁵⁵ The Water Court found no evidence that the parties' specific permitted water rights were before the Adjudication Court or that the State Engineer had intended to refer the matter to the Adjudication Court.¹⁵⁶ In addition, Moongate successfully established ownership through evidence that it developed the water rights by placing the water to beneficial use in accordance with *Hydro Resources*.¹⁵⁷ Because one of the causes of action involved a declaratory judgment, the Water Court declared "that Moongate is the valid holder of 82.49 afy of *permitted* water rights which originated from the Westmoreland 1988 Contract of Sale to Moongate, and which Moongate placed into beneficial use in 1997 as reflected in the meter readings filed with the OSE."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵¹ *Id.* (citing *Hydro Res. Corp. v. Gray*, 2007-NMSC-061, ¶¶ XXX, 143 N.M. 142, 173 P.3d 749, XXX).

¹⁵² *Hydro Res. Corp.*, 2007-NMSC-061, ¶ 27.

¹⁵³ *See id.* ¶¶ 41, 44.

¹⁵⁴ *Moongate*, D-307-CV-2013-1480.

¹⁵⁵ *Id.*

¹⁵⁶ *Id.* (The administrative order stayed the proceedings, "pending District Court determination . . ." of the issues. Trial Exhibit 51, D-307-CV-2013-1480).

¹⁵⁷ *Id.*

¹⁵⁸ *Id.* (emphasis added).

Through *Moongate*, the appellate courts will likely bring some long-awaited finality to this question of the jurisdiction of the Water Courts. Folded into the unresolved, larger Water Court jurisdictional question, however, lies the critical issue of the Water Court’s ability to assist the State Engineer with its administrative duties by making factual resolutions. Although *Moongate* may have temporarily resolved the issue of the Water Court’s jurisdiction, if the appellate courts affirm the district court decision, further issues will arise concerning the effect of the Water Courts’ factual determinations on an Adjudication Court. For example, the district court in *Moongate* resolved the factual issue of ownership of *permitted* water rights, but how will such a decision affect an Adjudication Court’s final determination of *ownership* of those same rights? As stated throughout this paper, the Water Court’s factual determinations are as to permitted water rights, which are usufructuary in nature.^{158A} By statute, the Adjudication Court can only make factual resolutions as a final order on the five elements of a water right after all claimants that a hydrographic survey identifies are joined.¹⁵⁹ Until then, all water rights are simply permitted rights.

iii. Res Judicata: The “grey area” where water court decisions affect title.

Res judicata presents another piece of the puzzle. Although res judicata is an equitable doctrine, it is relevant to this section because it relates to the present quandary of hybrid fact-finding functions. Specifically, the outstanding question is whether a Water Court’s factual resolution of an issue, such as ownership of permitted water rights, functions as res judicata on a claimant in an Adjudication Court.

Answering this question requires analysis of the particular issue’s factual context. For

^{158A} Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 41, 289 P.3d 1232, 1242.

¹⁵⁹ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-17 (2021).

instance, if the issue was the State Engineer's referral to the Water Court, and the State Engineer incorporated the Water Court's resolution in its own administrative findings, then any subsequent adjudication proceeding might, at the court's discretion, consider those findings to be the "law of the case" for that matter.¹⁶⁰ An issue resolved in the Water Court may again be raised in a subsequent "*inter se* proceeding" before the Adjudication Court.^{160A} Essentially, in that proceeding, claimants not parties to the original Water Court action can object to the water right of any other claimant before the Adjudication Court.^{160B} In that situation, the Adjudication Court might choose to apply the doctrine of the "law of the case" if the objectors are unable to present different facts or interests.¹⁶¹ If an objector does present different facts or changes the context in which the Water Court formulated its resolution, the Adjudication Court may choose to resolve the matter on its own as a final determination of rights.

On the other hand, if an issue arises between two private court litigants absent any State Engineer involvement, such as a dispute over the quantity of water from shared wells, then it is possible that the Adjudication Court will adopt a *res judicata* position on the issue. In summary, it is conceivable that a final adjudication could alter a Water Court decision made to assist the State Engineer in the administration of permitted water rights could, so long as the decision had a primary purpose of assisting the State Engineer in his administrative duties, rather than permanently affecting the rights and liabilities between parties.

The question of how an Adjudication Court will treat a Water Court's factual resolution of a disputed matter is thus presentation and context driven. Given the current pace of water law

¹⁶⁰ See *id.* § 72-7-1 (governing the procedure of appeal to district court).

^{160A} *Tri-State Generation*, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 7 n.1.

^{160B} See *id.*

¹⁶¹ See, e.g., *First Interstate Bank of Lea Cty. v. Heritage Square, Ltd.*, 1992-NMSC-037, ¶¶ 5, 9, 113 N.M. 763, 833 P.2d 240, 242-44 (Court's dismissal of owners' cross claim for amounts retained by tenant as offsets was "law of the case" regarding the landlords' claims against the tenant's principals).

development, this and associated issues will likely be addressed at some time in the near future. As more and more demands are placed on the State's scant water resources, these issues will arise more frequently and require more urgent resolution and finality.

iv. Beneficial use establishes ownership to a water right, as opposed to a Declaration of Ownership filed with the State Engineer.

Water Courts are increasingly tasked with resolving issues or disparities between the content of the State Engineer's files and extrinsic evidence of claimed rights.¹⁶² Such evidentiary disputes increase challenges to Water Court jurisdiction, and reaching a proper resolution requires an understanding of the administrative law and the policies governing administrative bodies.

As a preliminary matter, depending on the type or source of water right, a person or corporation "may" or "shall" file a declaration of ownership.¹⁶³ The Water Code provides some instruction here. Section 72-1-3 allows that any person or corporation seeking to declare pre-1907 water rights "*may make and file*" (emphasis added) a declaration with the State Engineer.¹⁶⁴ Section 72-1-2.1 requires that upon a change of ownership or conveyance of water rights, the new owner "*shall file a change of ownership form*" (emphasis added) with the office of the State Engineer.¹⁶⁵ Finally, a person or corporation claiming to be the owner of a vested water right from any underground source by applying such water to beneficial use "*may make and file*" (emphasis added) a declaration with OSE.¹⁶⁶ The typical legal argument in an ownership dispute

¹⁶² See, e.g., Moongate, D-307-CV-2013-1480.

¹⁶³ N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1-2.1, 3 (2021).

¹⁶⁴ § 72-1-3 (emphasis added).

¹⁶⁵ § 72-1-2.1.

¹⁶⁶ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-5 (West 2021).

occurs where the “first to file” prevails in such claim, especially when the change of ownership occurred under the mandatory filing declaration of Section 72-1-2.1.¹⁶⁷

However, the source of water may affect the claim of ownership, as *Moongate* illustrated.¹⁶⁸ Regardless of the statute that applies, filing a declaration of ownership form with the State Engineer does not in effect equate to filing a real estate deed, where the first filing may obtain priority over the second filing. Rather, both the New Mexico Constitution and Section 72-12-2 establish the bedrock principle of New Mexico water law: “Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit to the right to the use of the waters described in this act.”¹⁶⁹ The existing canon of case law and State Engineer regulations further bolster this principle. For example, Regulation No. 19.26.2.17(D) provides that even if the State Engineer accepts a change of ownership form for filing, that acceptance does not constitute per se approval of either the validity of the conveyance or of the right conveyed.¹⁷⁰ Rather, determination of water right ownership is left strictly to the courts. Thus, this regulation harmonizes case-law holdings that only the courts have the authority to adjudicate water rights.¹⁷¹

It is important to reiterate that a Water Court’s power to decide the ownership of a permitted water right does not derive from a sole source of statutory authority. Rather, it may result from the nature of the proceeding, the nature of the claimed right, or all of the above, as *Moongate* demonstrates.¹⁷² The converse of this result is also true: a Water Court may lack jurisdiction depending on the nature of the proceeding, the nature of the claimed water right, a statutory

¹⁶⁷ § 72-1-2.1.

¹⁶⁸ *See Moongate Water Co. v. Dona Ana Mut. Water Consumers Assoc.*, D-307-CV-2013-01480 (N.M. Dist.) (pending on appeal: A-1-CA-38589).

¹⁶⁹ N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3; *see* N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-2 (West 2021).

¹⁷⁰ Administration, N.M. Admin. Code § 19.26.2.17(D) (West 2021).

¹⁷¹ *State ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis*, 508 P.2d 577, 581 (N.M. 1973).

¹⁷² *See Moongate*, D-307-CV-2013-1480.

prohibition, or all of the above. Consequently, it is of paramount importance that a Water Court always conduct a thorough analysis of jurisdiction to determine whether it can proceed in the matter.

i. Water Courts cannot issue writs or orders which would alter the five basic elements of priority in a matter pending before an Adjudication Court.

Although Water Courts may decide issues based on permitted water rights, or on claimed but unadjudicated water rights, such courts must be cautious that any decision does not impair, contradict, or impede the work of an Adjudication Court. Moreover, Water Courts must be acutely aware that their decisions on permitted water rights may affect the recordings within the State Engineer's office, and thereby directly or indirectly affect the five components of a water right awaiting adjudication: its priority, amount, purpose, period, and place of use. While fact-specific resolutions may be unavoidable as necessary to assist the State Engineer in its administration of water, a Water Court should not allow its decisions to artificially insert or alter an element of a pending water adjudication claim.

Miller Farms v. Verhines exemplifies this fraught process.¹⁷³ There, the petitioners sought to have the Water Court compel the State Engineer to accept and file a Declaration of Water Rights that would vest the rights prior to the passage of the 1907 Laws.¹⁷⁴ Meanwhile, those same water rights were undergoing adjudication in the Adjudication Court.¹⁷⁵ Although the statute could be interpreted to require that the declaration “*shall* be recorded at length,” the Court reasoned that recording the declaration would have had the unlawful effect of “leap-frogging” previously recorded claims while the matter was pending before the Adjudication Court.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ See generally *Miller Farms v. Verhines*, No. 33416, 2014 WL 2534812, at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. April 29, 2014).

¹⁷⁴ *Id.*

¹⁷⁵ *Id.*

¹⁷⁶ *Id.*; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-3 (West 2021).

Thus, the Water Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to issue an alternative writ of mandamus against the State Engineer due to the pending Adjudication Court proceeding.¹⁷⁷ The Court of Appeals agreed that no Water Court jurisdiction existed, and so affirmed the denial of the alternative writ of mandamus.¹⁷⁸

V. MECHANICS OF WATER LAW: “REAL WORLD” PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLE APPLICATIONS

A. Administrative decisions can be susceptible to subsequent litigation on appeal or through ancillary district court litigation on issues not addressed administratively.

As stated earlier, the legislature may use its police powers to confer certain ‘quasi-judicial’ powers on administrative agencies with regard to laws affecting the general public; however, such powers do not extend to the determinations of rights and liabilities between individuals. As such, courts invoke certain standards reviewing administrative agency decisions.¹⁷⁹ On questions of fact, the court will generally defer to the decision of the agency, especially if the factual issues concern matters of specialized agency expertise.¹⁸⁰ On legal questions, courts afford a heightened degree of deference to the agency where questions of law implicate agency expertise or fundamental policy determinations within the scope of the agency's statutory function.¹⁸¹ However, the district courts’ review of the matter might not be so limited if an issue is left unaddressed, or if it is simply not necessary to an agency’s decision, as the case below illustrates.

In *Reynolds v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc.*, the State Engineer decided to permit a developer to repair a well existing under a pre-basin water right, subject to certain conditions.¹⁸² In its

¹⁷⁷ *Miller Farms*, 2014 WL 2534812 at *1.

¹⁷⁸ *Id.*

¹⁷⁹ *See, e.g.*, N.M. R. CIV. P. DIST. CT. 1-074.

¹⁸⁰ *See Smith v. City of Santa Fe*, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 10, 11, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300.

¹⁸¹ *See Morningstar Water Users Ass'n v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n*, 904 P.2d 28, 32 (N.M. 1995).

¹⁸² *State of N.M. ex rel. S.E. Reynolds v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc.*, 624 P.2d 502, 503 (N.M. 1981).

application for repair, the applicant requested a permit to repair and clean the well, but did not request a change in the amount of water it could use.¹⁸³ Because the well was not repairable for a number of reasons, the applicant then applied for a permit to change the location of the well.¹⁸⁴ This application also requested an 18-inch diameter well to replace the original 7-inch well.¹⁸⁵ The State Engineer approved the change of location application; however, it notified the applicant that changing the location would be conditioned on the same size and depth of the previous permit.¹⁸⁶ Upon a protest hearing, the State Engineer asserted that the doctrine of administrative *res judicata* barred litigation of the issue of the depth of the well and the diameter of the pipe.¹⁸⁷

On a *de novo* appeal, the district court found that the applicant could continue to construct the well pursuant to the doctrine of relation back under *State v. Mendenhall*.¹⁸⁸ This right included the right to change the location of the well absent any size or depth limitations, since the initial permit did not require a statement of limitation to repair the well.¹⁸⁹ The Supreme Court agreed and held that the State Engineer could not impose limitations on the well's size and depth since it had not found that changing the well's location would impair existing rights. The only caveat was that the developer could not withdraw more than a specified amount of water per year.¹⁹⁰ The Court pointed out that a party should not have to litigate every incidental matter which might come up in a proceeding before the State Engineer for fear of losing its claim

¹⁸³ *Id.* at 504.

¹⁸⁴ *Id.* at 503.

¹⁸⁵ *Id.*

¹⁸⁶ *Id.*

¹⁸⁷ *Id.* at 504.

¹⁸⁸ *Id.* at 503–04 (citing *State v. Mendenhall*, 362 P.2d 998 (N.M. 1961)) (providing that for a claim of relation back of their water rights priority date, a party is required to show that they: (1) legally commenced drilling their well before declaration of the basin, (2) proceeded diligently to develop a means of applying the water pursuant to a plan, and (3) applied the water to beneficial use within a reasonable time).

¹⁸⁹ *Id.* at 504.

¹⁹⁰ *Id.* at 506.

forever.¹⁹¹ Here, where neither the depth of applicant's well, the diameter of the pipe, nor the amount of water were at issue or essential to the prior decision, the State Engineer's determination did not bar the subsequent litigation of those issues.¹⁹²

Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., is significant to Water Courts because it shows that an administrative decision may not bar subsequent litigation over application or permit conditions when those same conditions are not at issue and non-essential to the State Engineer's application or permit decision. However, a Water Court's analysis of whether the question at issue is one that implicates special agency expertise or a determination of fundamental policies within the scope of agency's statutory function should precede this conclusion. If so, then the Water Court should contemplate whether a remand to the agency is the best resolution.

B. Governmental immunity statutes may not apply to the jurisdictional authority of the Water Courts.

Governmental entities are frequently sued in order to have rights determined or clarified. If a statute were to immunize any governmental entity from having to defend any action to clarify water-related issues, then such rights would never be settled. Thus, the logic behind this policy choice attempts to ward off absurd results.

Prior case law indicates that water rights are treated as property rights.¹⁹³ Governmental entities, specifically quasi-governmental entities such as mutual domestic water associations, have previously raised this characterization of water rights as a basis for immunity.¹⁹⁴ Litigants

¹⁹¹ *Id.* at 504.

¹⁹² *Id.*

¹⁹³ *See* *Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Regents of N.M. State Univ.*, 849 P.2d 372, 381 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (“Water rights are real property rights that are generally tied to specific land.”).

¹⁹⁴ *See, e.g.*, *Moongate Water Co. v. Dona Ana Mut. Water Consumers Assoc.*, D-307-CV-2013-01480 (N.M. Dist.) (pending on appeal: A-1-CA-38589) (relying on § 42-11-1, which provides in relevant part that “The State of New Mexico and its political subdivisions...are granted immunity from and may not be named a defendant in any suit....involving a claim of title to or interest in real property except as specifically authorized by law.”).

such as in the *Moongate* decision rely upon section 42-11-1 to support this defense: “The state of New Mexico and its political subdivisions . . . are granted immunity from and may not be named a defendant in any suit . . . involving a claim of title to or interest in real property except as specifically authorized by law.”¹⁹⁵

The key language of section 42-11-1 that allows Water Courts to exercise jurisdiction over the quasi-governmental or governmental entities is the phrase “except as specifically authorized by law.”¹⁹⁶ Frequently, issues affecting water rights are brought through the Declaratory Judgment Act.¹⁹⁷ Under that Act, the State of New Mexico, or any state official, may be sued when the parties’ legal relations call for the construction of any statute or laws of the State of New Mexico.¹⁹⁸ In the context of a State Engineer decision or action, the laws of New Mexico” are frequently implicated through the Water Code.¹⁹⁹ Thus, governmental entities are regularly subject to water law questions.

Governmental and quasi-governmental entities also fall under the jurisdiction of the Water Courts for purposes of equitable actions. As previously discussed, the *Carlsbad Irrigation District* and *Village of Wagon Mound* decisions are both consistent with the dictates of section 72-5-39 insofar as water shall be used in the manner provided by the laws of the state, but such laws, “. . . shall in no way be construed to affect the existing right of a court of equity in the exercise of its general equity powers to grant relief to the state of New Mexico by injunction or otherwise.”²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁵ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (West 2021).

¹⁹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁹⁷ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-6-13 (1978), <https://www.nmcompcomm.us>.

¹⁹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹⁹ *See, e.g.*, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-1 (1978), <https://www.nmcompcomm.us>.

²⁰⁰ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-39 (1978), <https://www.nmcompcomm.us>; *see generally* *Carlsbad Irrigation Dist. v. Ford*, 128 P.2d 1047 (N.M. 1942); *Vill. of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust*, 2003-NMCA-035, 133 N.M. 373, 62 P.3d

While the general state of the law does not appear to support a claim of immunity, some entities may still choose to mount that defense. Of course, sometimes a governmental entity might not raise an immunity defense because it has a strategic interest in the particular dispute being resolved.²⁰¹ Whatever the case, foundational rules remain intact: the adjudication court maintains exclusive jurisdiction to hear all water right adjudication questions, the State owns all waters, and the district courts have authority to grant relief, including equitable relief.²⁰² Courts are thus empowered to decide these matters because water conservation and preservation are of upmost importance to the doctrine of maximum utilization as a fundamental requisite of beneficial use.²⁰³

C. Transfers of water rights are independent of the process of foreclosure proceedings.

Water right transfers operate independently of bank or other commercial transfers. Sections 72-5-22 and 72-5-23 govern the method for transferring an existing water right.²⁰⁴ Section 72-5-22 recognizes the right of a party holding a water right to assign that right, but specifies that no assignment “shall be binding except upon the parties thereto, unless filed for record in the office of the state engineer.”²⁰⁵ Section 72-5-23 provides that water used for irrigation purposes shall be considered appurtenant to the land upon which it is used, and thus can only be severed from the land “. . . upon approval of an application of the owner by the state engineer.”²⁰⁶

1255; *see also* *Bounds v. State*, 2011-NMCA-011, ¶ 4, 149 N.M. 484, 252 P.3d 708 (determining that an action against the state and state engineer for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that domestic well statute was unconstitutional).

²⁰¹ *See, e.g.*, *Burnham v. City of Farmington*, 1998-NMCA-056, ¶ 2, 125 N.M. 129, 957 P.2d 1163 (bringing a quiet title action against the city to resolve a disputed river boundary).

²⁰² N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-17 (1978), <https://www.nmcompcomm.us>; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-39 (1978), <https://www.nmcompcomm.us>.

²⁰³ *See, e.g.*, *Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States*, 657 F.2d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1981).

²⁰⁴ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-22 (1978), <https://www.nmcompcomm.us> (governing transfer of water rights); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (1978), <https://www.nmcompcomm.us> (governing water appurtenant to land).

²⁰⁵ § 72-5-22.

²⁰⁶ § 72-5-23; *McCasland v. Miskell*, 890 P.2d 1322, 1326 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

Water transfers, sales, or assignments are occasionally attempted outside of the manner provided under the Water Code. This may occur through real estate contracts, deeds, or written assignments. In the context of a foreclosure proceeding where the deeded rights are at issue, the district courts must determine the legal status of all property, including the associated water rights. Similarly, the district or Water Court necessarily becomes involved in resolving legal complications resulting from the transfer of water rights outside of the Water Code.

The *McCasland* case involves a complex fact pattern which highlights the additional legal complications that can arise when parties attempt water rights transfers outside of the Water Code process.²⁰⁷ The property at issue, ultimately the subject of a foreclosure proceeding, involved a feedlot with 28.74 acre-feet of irrigation water rights that remained appurtenant to the feedlot property subsequently acquired by the defendant.²⁰⁸ The plaintiffs contended that when the non-feed yard property was conveyed to them, the defendant deeded all water rights, including appurtenant water rights.²⁰⁹ Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed to have used the 28.74 acre-feet on the other deeded property for some years.²¹⁰ Problematically, there was no evidence that any of the parties had complied with the procedures under the Water Code to formalize any transfer of water rights.²¹¹ As a consequence, the Court of Appeals held that merely using the 28.74 acre-feet water on another parcel did not effect a transfer of those water rights from the feed yard.²¹² The district court further erred in declaring the plaintiffs owners of the water rights,

²⁰⁷ *McCasland*, 890 P.2d at 1323.

²⁰⁸ *Id.*

²⁰⁹ *Id.* at 1324.

²¹⁰ *Id.* at 1325.

²¹¹ *Id.* at 1326.

²¹² *Id.* at 1327.

absent the prior landowner seeking to sever water rights from land in compliance with the statutory method.²¹³

In a similar district court foreclosure, a creditor bank sought to foreclose on a lien that included the water rights on part of a dairy farm.²¹⁴ The creditor failed to fulfill the requirements of section 72-1-2.1 for a transfer of water rights, and further failed to properly acknowledge its recorded mortgage.²¹⁵ Since the change of ownership forms were not properly recorded with the state engineer, the creditor's interest in the water rights was never perfected.²¹⁶

Occasionally during foreclosures, subsequent developments or oversights may hurt the accuracy of the state engineer's documentation, even if the parties transferring water rights follow the proper Water Code process. In such circumstances, foreclosures may be completed with the property, but water rights resolution should be delegated to the state engineer through a decree that declares *permitted* water rights as recognized but, “. . . as may be further developed before, and determined by the Office of the State Engineer.”²¹⁷

By way of example, in *Moore v. La Union Holdings*, an owner sold restaurant property along with the water rights to the initial buyers, who promptly filed a declaration of ownership with the state engineer.²¹⁸ Due to health code and zoning restrictions, the point of diversion was moved to another well on a neighbor's adjoining farmland.²¹⁹ The initial buyers then defaulted on the contract, and the permitted water rights remained in their names under a water-sharing

²¹³ *Id.* at 1328.

²¹⁴ *In re Borges*, 485 B.R. 743, 752 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012).

²¹⁵ *Id.* at 795; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2.1 (1978), <https://www.nmcompcomm.us> (governing change of ownership, recording, constructive notice).

²¹⁶ *In re Borges*, 485 B.R. at 795-96.

²¹⁷ *Moongate Water Co. v. Dona Ana Mut. Water Consumers Assoc.*, D-307-CV-2013-01480 (N.M. Dist.) (pending on appeal: A-1-CA-38589)

²¹⁸ *Id.*

²¹⁹ *Id.*

agreement filed with the state engineer.²²⁰ Later, the owner failed to assign the water sharing agreement to the subsequent buyers of the restaurant.²²¹ A foreclosure of the restaurant and the water rights was eventually filed against the subsequent buyers.²²² Upon entry of the foreclosure decree, the district court recognized the owners' possession of the permitted water rights ". . . and as may be developed before, and determined by the Office of the State Engineer" so as to give the parties an opportunity to correct the documentation within the state engineer's office.²²³

D. The Adjudication of a "Stream System" Includes Permitted Underground Water Rights.

Throughout this paper, we have utilized the terms "permitted" water rights and "holders" of water rights to distinguish between inchoate water rights and adjudicated water rights. There is also a literal distinction between surface water rights and underground water rights.²²⁴ However, this latter distinction bears little meaning for purposes of an adjudication. While "underground water rights" are not statutorily described as part of the "waters of any stream system," the legislative intent contemplates that judicial decree settle all water rights in the state.²²⁵

The argument in *City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds* turned upon whether the territorial legislature may have intended the state engineer to have different duties in light of the later-adopted statutory underground waters article.²²⁶ However, the Supreme Court rejected this view

²²⁰ *Id.*

²²¹ *Id.*

²²² *Id.*

²²³ *Id.*

²²⁴ N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-5-1 through 75-5-39 (1978) (regarding Appropriation and Use of Surface Water); §§ 72-12-1 through 72-12-28 (regarding Underground Waters).

²²⁵ *See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sharp*, 344 P.2d 943, 944 (N.M. 1959) (explaining that the 1907 water code statute is 'all-embracing' and includes claimed rights of appropriators from an artesian basin within a stream system); *City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds*, 379 P.2d 73, 79 (N.M. 1962); *see also* Order Regarding Adjudication Procedures, *Moongate Water Co. v. Dona Ana Mut. Water Consumers Assoc.*, D-307-CV-2013-01480 (N.M. Dist.) (pending on appeal: A-1-CA-38589) (setting forth the process for the Lower Rio Grande Adjudication, which encompasses adjudication for four basins in the Lower Rio Grande survey and "other areas not otherwise described", in addition to the stream system of the surface waters.).

²²⁶ *Reynolds*, 379 P.2d at 79.

and found no meaningful distinction in the jurisdiction and duties of the state engineer with regard to stream and underground waters appropriation.²²⁷ While the New Mexico legislature has provided somewhat different administrative procedures for the two sources, the substantive rights are identical once obtained.

Another state engineer duty under the Water Code is determining water rights through filing a system-wide adjudication of any stream system.²²⁸ Filing this stream system adjudication affords the court exclusive jurisdiction over the adjudication. Thus, the legislature evidently designed judicial decrees to adjudicate and settle all water rights in the state.²²⁹ Furthermore, considering that stream flows are often interconnected with other sources of water, the Supreme Court in *El Paso & Rock Island Railway Co. v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District* held that the statutes clearly contemplate all rights in a system, both underground and surface, for purposes of a system-wide adjudication.²³⁰

VI. SUMMARY

This paper primarily explores and analyzes the origins and the jurisdiction of the New Mexico Water Courts. Any analysis of the jurisdiction of the state engineer or the Adjudication Court is cursory, and a thorough examination is beyond this paper. Nevertheless, understanding the Water Courts' jurisdiction does require general comprehension of the jurisdiction of the other two entities.

Ascertaining Water Court jurisdiction can be complex depending on the source of the authority. On one hand, an appeal from the State Engineer's action or inaction under the Water

²²⁷ *See id.*

²²⁸ N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-17 (1978), <https://www.nmcompcomm.us>.

²²⁹ *Snow v. Abalos*, 140 P. 1044, 1050 (N.M 1914).

²³⁰ *El Paso & R. I. Ry. Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Fifth Jud. Dist.*, 8 P.2d 1064, 1067 (N.M 1931).

Code is largely straightforward and statutory. On the other hand, a water law dispute between private litigants with permitted water rights—who may or may not have a pending adjudication—likely requires some analysis before a Water Court can determine if its jurisdiction has been properly invoked. This analysis will most likely require a review of administrative law, water law principles, and, at times, constitutional law. In the end, knowing the function and purpose for each component in the New Mexico water law system, the parameters under which they operate, and recognizing those grey areas where the components may mutually coexist and operate will hopefully result in understanding the process by which the puzzle of water administration in New Mexico works.